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The Economics of Communist Party Membership - the Curious Case of the Rising 
Numbers and Wage Premium during China’s Transition 
 
 
Why is it that, as the Chinese Communist Party has loosened its grip, abandoned its core 
beliefs, and marketized the economy, its membership has risen markedly along with the 
economic benefits of joining? We use three national household surveys, spanning eleven 
years, to answer this question with respect to labour market rewards in urban China. We 
conceptualize individual demand for Party membership as an investment in “political capital” 
that brings monetary rewards in terms of higher wages. This wage premium has risen with the 
growing wage differentials associated with the emergence of a labour market and the 
continuing value of political status in the semi-marketized transitional economy. However, a 
demand-side explanation does not explain the fact that the wage premium is higher for the 
personal characteristics that reduce the probability of membership. We develop an 
explanation in terms of a rationing of places and a scarcity value for members with those 
characteristics.  
 
JEL Classification: J31, J40, J71, P20, P30 
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1. Introduction 
 
A paradox of the reform process in China is that, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP 
hereafter) has loosened its grip on the economy and seemingly abandoned its core beliefs, its 
membership has risen markedly along with the economic benefits from joining. Karl Marx 
famously envisaged the state “withering away” in the advanced stage of communism. 
Outsiders have often made a similar assumption about the Communist Party withering away 
with marketization. In China, the Party exercised considerable control over pay and 
promotion during the planning period (Groves et al., 1995). However, this control has been 
eroded, so the naïve assumption would be that the wage premium to Party membership 
should fall. This in turn should reduce recruitment among opportunistic would-be members, 
while idealists may be repelled by the Party’s abandonment of its core beliefs. Instead, 
membership has expanded from 3.8% of China’s population in 1978 to 5.2% in 2002. In June 
2002, the CCP had 66m members, 5.2% of the total population, making it the largest political 
organization in the world. In this paper, we show that the wage premium associated with 
being a member has risen over time.  
 
We can distinguish several explanations for the wage premium. The Party may use its 
influence to give preferential treatment to its members in order to ensure their loyalty. As 
Walder (1995, p.323) states “career rewards for the politically loyal has been one of the 
foundations of Communist Party rule”. Li and Walder (2001) analyse access to elite 
administrative positions and show how members who join the Party early in their career 
appear to benefit from its patronage. There can also be less principled rent-seeking, with 
members using their political power to promote their own interests. More generally, 
membership may give access to contacts that are useful for a career and thus increase the 
individual’s social capital. The “New Class” theory of Djilas (1957) argued that, although 
communist parties might have come to power with the aim of promoting egalitarian societies, 
in practice they gave rise to a “redistributive elite”. These explanations imply a causal link 
from membership to wages: that membership brings economic benefits. However, it is also 
possible that the relation is non-causal. Standard empirical models of wage determination 
omit variables – loosely referred to as “ability” - that may be associated with both Party 
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membership and higher wages. The Party has on occasion recruited the most productive 
workers in an enterprise or, if it wants to fill a cadre post with a particularly promising 
individual, may recruit that person at the same time as appointing them to a post.  
 
How would we expect economic reform to affect these relationships between Party 
membership and wage differentials? We have already referred to the prediction that the 
diminished role of the Party in the economy should imply a lower economic return to 
membership during the transition. During the planning period, as Groves et al. (1995, p.876) 
state: “the Communist Party … functioned more or less as the personnel department of this 
enormous corporation, maintaining dossiers and tracking managerial careers.” The Party 
approved promotions and certain posts of responsibility were reserved only for its members. 
Urban reforms in the 1980s largely removed the formal role of the CCP in determining 
promotions within state-owned enterprises (SOEs hereafter). The Party still approved the 
appointment of enterprise managers, but these managers then had autonomy over promotions 
within the enterprise. Greater managerial autonomy within the SOE sector, coupled with an 
expansion of private sector, might be expected to lead wages to be set according to worker 
productivity rather than political loyalty. Thus Nee (1989) hypothesised that membership 
should lose its privileges as marketisation raised the returns to productivity (human capital) 
and reduced the redistributive power of the Party.  
 
This hypothesis is contradicted by the evidence of an increasing wage premium on CCP 
membership. An alternative hypothesis is that marketisation can increase the private value of 
membership because productive, personal or power relations can now attract monetary 
rewards, a symptom of which is the general rise in income inequality and the widening of 
wage structures. Prior to reform, there was little job mobility and wages were set largely by 
administrative pay scales. With reform, managers have the power to vary wages. This enables 
wages to vary across individuals, whether it is due to productivity, particularism or social 
capital. If the CCP premium merely results from selectivity or reverse causality, then reforms 
which increase the returns to productivity could also increase the premium. Alternatively, the 
reforms may allow more scope for rent seeking as there is more scope for wages to differ 
within and between enterprises. Marketisation may increase the value of information and 
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networks. Party membership can have a “sheepskin” effect, signalling the presence of certain 
characteristics. Members may use their networks to find information on job opportunities. 
This informational and network role of the Party may be particularly valuable during 
transition, when alternative information systems are incomplete and unreliable. 
 
In this paper, we use household survey data to analyse the determinants of CCP membership 
and the associated wage premium. The data come from the China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) surveys, designed by a team of international scholars, including the authors, and 
researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. There are two main attractions of the 
CHIP surveys for this work. First, they provide a very detailed measurement of income and 
labour supply. Second, the surveys are large-scale and designed to be nationally 
representative (although we use only the urban component). The CHIP surveys draw sub-
samples of households from the annual national household income survey of the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), covering 10 out of 31 provinces in 1988, 11 in 1995 and 6 in 
1999. A limitation of our samples is that only households with urban registration (hukou) are 
included. The NBS surveys of urban China exclude most rural-urban migrant households, 
since these are denied urban hukou.  
 
 
2. The empirical literature on the wage premium for CCP membership 
 
There have been many studies of wage determination or income inequality in China that 
include estimates of the premium for CCP membership. However, only a few papers are 
devoted to the topic - notably, Morduch and Sicular (2000), Bian and Logan (1996), Lam 
(2003), Liu (2003) and Li et al. (2007). A related body of work is that by Walder on the 
effects of CCP membership on attainment of elite occupations (Walder, 1995; Li and Walder, 
2001). We focus primarily on results for urban China.  
 
Most empirical studies take CCP membership as exogenous and do not allow for the fact that 
members may differ from non-members by virtue of unobserved, pre-existing characteristics 
that are related to earnings (“ability”). The three studies that allow for endogeneity (or, 
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equivalently, selectivity) reach contradictory results - one found the problem insignificant; 
one found it biased the OLS estimates downwards, and the third found an upwards bias. The 
conclusion that OLS estimates were biased downwards was drawn by Liu (2003), who used 
the CHIP 1988 and confined his analysis to households containing father-son pairs of 
workers. Using the father’s education as an instrument for the son’s CCP membership, he 
found the wage premium rose from 11% when estimated in OLS to 51% after instrumenting. 
Lam (2003) took a similar approach to analysing a survey of workers in Shanghai in 1996. 
Using whether the father was a CCP member to identify the impact of Party membership, she 
found no evidence of a selectivity bias to OLS estimates, with the selectivity correction being 
insignificant. Conversely, Li et al. (2007) used a survey of Chinese identical twins in 2003. 
They also found a wage premium of around 11% from OLS analysis, but it disappeared to 
almost zero when estimated using a within-twin-pair fixed-effects model. They concluded 
that the premium is purely a return to unobserved ability and ended their paper with a paean 
to the “high quality” of CCP members.  
 
It will be seen that our results are closest to those of Lam (2003): we do not find selectivity to 
be a serious problem. The conflicting results in the literature may reflect data differences - for 
example, Li et al. (2007) found no CCP wage premium for younger workers even using OLS. 
There may also be problems with the instruments used - parental Party membership and 
sometimes other aspects of parental occupation. Twin estimates have their own 
methodological limitations. Specifically, they may be biased downwards owing to 
measurement error - a problem normally solved by instrumenting in the literature on returns 
to education but this solution was not available to Li et al. (2007). In the context of education, 
it has been argued that measurement error may render within-twin-pair fixed-effects less 
reliable than OLS (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).  
 
The studies that consider selectivity do not examine changes in premiums over time. Of the 
studies looking at time trends in the observed wage premium, some reach strong conclusions 
based on very limited data. For example, Morduch and Sicular (2000) argue that Party 
members have benefited in particular from the reform process, but base their conclusion on 
only one rural country in northern China and cover only the short period 1990-93. Xie and 
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Hannum (1996) argue that the premium does not change with economic growth, but base 
their analysis purely on the finding that the CCP wage premium as estimated in the CHIP 
1988 survey does not vary with the city-level economic growth rate over the period 1985-88.  
Most studies that estimate observed income differentials by CCP membership over time find 
they increased in recent years. Bian and Logan (1996) find a rise in the premium for Party 
membership when analysing data from Tianjin spanning 1978-93. Wu (2006) uses life 
histories and finds a significant effect of CCP membership when modelling income per capita 
in urban China in 1996. Since Wu also controls for 1986 income, this result implies that 
members enjoyed faster income growth between 1986 and 1996, ceteris paribus. Knight and 
Song (2003), using the CHIP 1988 and 1995 surveys, estimate that the CP premium doubled, 
from 4.2 to 9.0%.  
 
Aside from looking at changes over time, a second focus of this paper is how the wage 
premium for CCP membership varies with other determinants of earnings. Lam (2003) finds a 
premium in SOEs and collectives, but not in private enterprises. Bishop et al. (2005) use the 
CHIP 1988 and 1995 to estimate the premium using quantile regressions. For 1995, they find 
the premium falls as the earnings quantile rises, implying that membership has a larger effect 
on workers with unfavourable unobserved determinants of earnings.  
 
 
3. Framework: the economics of Communist Party membership 
 
In Western political systems, parties compete against each other for power and so are 
relatively open in admitting new members, since these provide funds and personnel for this 
political competition. For the individual, joining a party may be seen as primarily marking an 
ideological affiliation and membership is unlikely to have a direct effect on one’s career or 
economic circumstances. By contrast, in China, the CCP has a monopoly on political power 
and historically has maintained its grip on power by virtue of a loyal membership, carefully 
vetted on admission and subject to scrutiny thereafter. Moreover, its dominant position and its 
occupation of important administrative positions imply that joining can bring real economic 
benefits to the individual. 
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The Party’s screening of prospective members 
 
Joining the CCP requires two decisions: that the individual decides to join and that the Party 
decides to admit the individual. We refer to the former decision as the individual’s demand 
for membership and the latter decision as reflecting the Party’s screening of members. The 
process has three broad stages. First, the individual must make a formal application; although 
Guo (2002) states that the initial approach nonetheless usually comes from the Party. Second, 
there is a period of observation and training. The individual must participate in study sessions 
and community service while subject to daily monitoring. One or two CCP members act as 
liaisons (lian xi ren) while background checks on the applicant are performed and opinions 
sought from other members. Third, after admission there is a one-year probationary period. 
Even after their probation, members are subject to a degree of scrutiny by the Party and can 
be expelled if they fail to attend meetings for six months without good reason. Individuals’ 
decisions to join are essentially irreversible, with loss of Party membership being seen as very 
serious.2  
 
The Party looks for recruits who are committed to its values and will participate actively in 
politics. Beyond this, it is possible to discern several important overall trends in the screening 
criteria (Bian et al., 2001). Prior to 1949, revolutionary ideals were the qualities sought in 
new members but class background was often used as a loyalty filter. Similar criteria existed 
in the planning period, 1950-78. Parental membership of the CCP was added to class 
background as a screen for loyalty. However, political commitment and participation was also 
required. Owing to the key role of the Party in administering the economy and the machinery 
of government, membership became increasingly urbanized and professional competence 
grew in importance. Exemplary workers were often targeted for recruitment. The Cultural 
Revolution represented a backlash against increasing managerialism, and during this period 
of discord intellectuals were regarded with suspicion. The reform period, from 1979 onwards, 
saw a marked change in the criteria. With the prioritization of economic growth, the CCP 
sought to recruit economically productive members. Education replaced class background as 
an explicit criterion. In 2001 private business people were openly invited to join: 
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entrepreneurs were now acknowledged as part of the “advanced productive forces” that the 
CCP was now supposed to stand for. In summary, the CCP’s screening criteria have an 
important effect on who joins, although the particular criteria used have changed markedly 
over time. 
 
The individual’s demand for Party membership 
 
While ideological reasons and “commitment” may have led some to join the CCP early on, 
the level of commitment is likely to have diminished as the realities of life under Communist 
rule became apparent. Political campaigns such as the mass mobilizations during the Cultural 
Revolution can be seen in part as an attempt to recreate the ideological fervour that had 
driven Party members. But in the reform period, it seems increasingly unlikely that people 
joined the CCP for ideological reasons as the Party gradually abandoned most of the ideology 
that was its raison d’etre. Traditional Communist precepts were overturned by contrary 
slogans such as that of Deng Xiaoping that “to get rich is glorious”. After over twenty years 
of reform, this culminated in the CCP lacking a clear ideological basis.3 
 
A survey of university students in Shanghai in 1988 suggested widespread cynicism about the 
reasons people became members (Guo, 2002). Students in 18 universities were asked about 
their friends’ motivations for joining. 49% of respondents picked the response that “In reality 
they want a “Party card” which they can use as capital to receive future benefits”. Only 4% 
chose the option “They believe in Communism and want to make a contribution”. Indeed, the 
growing perception that membership provides material benefits and is a vehicle for 
opportunistic careerism may have deterred more idealistic people from joining. 
 
Instead, joining the Party can be viewed as being based on a cost-benefit analysis of private 
material advantage. Just as education is regarded as an investment in human capital, CCP 
membership can be regarded as an investment in what is sometimes termed political capital. 
The costs of membership are not primarily financial – membership dues are low. The costs 
may be largely up front – subjecting oneself to an onerous screening procedure. Subsequent 
costs take the form of time devoted to CCP activities and submission to scrutiny and 
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discipline. However, membership may bring various forms of benefit: additional income, 
additional perks, higher status and greater power or influence. The non-economic benefits can 
be ends in themselves as well as providing means of obtaining economic benefits.  
 
The selection process 
 
The selection process can be formalized as follows. Let P* represent the unobserved net utility 
placed on CCP membership by an individual and V * represent the unobserved net utility to the 
Party of the individual’s membership. We postulate the index functions 
P *   =   a´ X    +   u       (1) 
V *   =   b´Z     +    v                                (2) 
where X is a vector of personal characteristics influencing individual preferences, Z is a vector of 
characteristics that the Party values in its members, and u and v are error terms.  
 
If P* is positive, the person wants to join the Party, and if V * is positive, the Party wants him to 
join. Where M is a dummy variable indicating Party membership, the decision rule is 
M   =   1   iff   P* > 0   and   V* > 0   
M   =   0   iff   P* < 0    or    V* < 0. 
 
If u and v have the standard properties, the probability of a person wanting to join is Φ(a´X ) and 
the conditional probability of being chosen is Φ(b´Z), where Φ(.) is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. On the assumption of independence between these choices, the 
probability of observing that a person belongs to the CCP is Φ(a´ X)Φ( b´Z ). In the absence of 
rationing, only Φ(a´ X) is relevant: all the parameters in b´Z except the constant term are zero. 
Identification of the separate equations is problematic if both decisions are influenced by the 
same set of variables (Z= X). In the empirical analysis of Section 4, we use a simple binary probit 
to model whether urban workers are Party members: 
 
M*   =    c´ X  +  ε      (3)  
M   =   1   iff   M* > 0    
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The significant coefficients c in the estimated equation must be examined for consistency 
with screening (CCP preferences) and demand (personal preferences) interpretations. 
 
Some insight into these alternative interpretations of the determinants of CCP membership can be 
gained by looking at how the wage premium for membership varies with individual 
characteristics. Wage functions can be estimated separately for Party members and non-members: 
lnY   =   dp´ Q +   sp  if M=1  (4) 
     =   dn´ Q +   sn  if M=0 
where lnY is the log wage and s is the error term. The wage gains from membership are thus: 
 
 E(lnY |M=1)  - E(lnY |M=0)  =   (dp- dn)´Q +   E(sp|M=1) – E(sn|M=0)        (5) 
 
The differences in vectors of coefficients dp and dn can then be compared with common variables 
in the vector c in the Party membership equation. 
 
If membership is primarily demand-determined, one might expect a correspondence of c and (dp - 
dn): characteristics that increase the economic benefit from membership also increase the 
probability of membership.  However, such a pattern will not necessarily be observed in a rent-
seeking equilibrium. A higher benefit (rent) for members of one type may induce more people of 
that type to join the Party, driving the average benefit for them down to equal the cost of 
membership. However, a positive correspondence between c and (dp - dn) may arise if the costs of 
membership to individuals are heterogeneous. Some individuals are likely to be more averse to 
the non-pecuniary costs: higher wage benefits will be required to induce such people to join. 
Hence one will tend to see higher wage premia for groups with higher rates of membership. 
 
Conversely, if membership is determined by the Party’s screening - a rationing process, rather 
than demand - one might expect a negative relation between c and (dp - dn). Suppose membership 
provides rents that only members of a certain type can compete for. If the Party restricts the 
numbers of members of one type, there will be less competition for the rents available for this 
type and thus higher average rents. For example, suppose Party membership is required for 
lucrative posts of responsibility within two groups of workers (say, employees at factories A and 
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B).  If the Party acts to restrict the supply of workers of one type (say, at factory A) who become 
members, then the lucky few who are members will have a greater chance of being given a 
lucrative post. In this instance, lower probabilities of being a member will be associated with 
higher returns to membership.  
 
Another issue arising in the paper concerns the interpretation of the apparent increase in the wage 
premium. Preliminary findings indicate that a premium exists and that it has been rising over 
time. It is possible that unobserved ability is a determinant of both CCP membership and wages, 
and that both of these relationships have become more important over time, i.e. the Party has 
become more meritocratic and merit has been more rewarded in the labour market. This could 
explain the apparent premium and its rise over the years. 
 
These problems can be viewed as arising from correlations between the unobserved factors, ε, 
which determine Party membership and those unobserved factors, s, that determine wages. 
Consistent estimates can be dealt with using the sample selection correction suggested by 
Heckman (1979). This requires that we have instruments for membership: variables that are 
closely correlated with M but are not direct determinants of wages. In the data that we have, 
information on parental CCP membership would appear a priori to be a good instrument. A 
second way of correcting for this problem is to use panel data. If the unobserved determinants 
that cause biases are time-invariant, then they will be removed by using a fixed effects estimator. 
We are able to construct a short panel for the late 1990s using recall data on wages. 
Unfortunately, we do not know when the respondents joined, so we are not able to obtain a fixed 
effects estimate of the overall wage premium for membership.4 However, we are able to use the 
panel to see if CCP members in 1999 had enjoyed higher wage growth than non-members. 
 
 
4. Empirical determinants of CCP membership 
 
What characteristics increase the probability of workers being CCP members? In this section we 
use binomial probit models to estimate the empirical determinants of an urban worker being a 
member. We confine the analysis to the sample of urban workers earning wages, since our 
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primary focus is on the effect of membership on wages. Two sets of explanatory variables are 
included: personal characteristics (sex, age, ethnicity, education and city of residence) and job-
related characteristics (occupation, ownership and industrial sectors). We estimate one model for 
each of the survey years, noting the rise in membership in our data from 23.5% in 1988 to 24.5% 
in 1995 and 26.9% in 1999 (descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1 of the Online 
Appendix). Table 1 reports the results of the probit models, and Table 2 considers the predictions 
of the model evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. Pair-wise Wald tests were 
conducted for whether the coefficients in the models changed significantly over time. 
 
Of the personal characteristics, being male, educated and experienced all increased the 
probability of CCP membership in each of the surveys. The “pure” gender gap in the probability 
narrowed over time. Evaluating at the means of other explanatory variables, the probability of a 
woman being in the Party doubled from 8% in 1988 to 16% in 1999; for men, the corresponding 
increase was from 22% to 24%. There was also a significant rise in the importance of education. 
For example, compare two workers (with otherwise average characteristics): one with college 
education (15 years) and the other with junior middle school education (9 years). In 1988, such a 
college graduate had a 22% predicted probability of being a member, rising to 38% in 1999. By 
contrast, the prospects for a comparable worker with junior middle school were virtually 
unchanged at 12% in 1988 and 13% in 1999. The chances of less educated workers being 
members fell, ceteris paribus, in the same interval. Experience also appeared to have become 
increasingly important for access. 
 
Turning to the work-related variables, factors that make Party membership more likely include 
being a white collar worker, being employed in an SOE and working in government 
administration. These findings reflect the CCP’s historical role in administering many aspects of 
life in China. In our probit models, the single most statistically significant variable is the dummy 
variable for being a blue collar worker, which reduces the probability of being a member (the 
default being white collar). At the mean of other explanatory variables, white collar workers had 
a 33% probability of being in the Party in 1999 whereas blue collar workers had only an 11% 
probability. The CCP has less influence in the private sector, so recruitment there may be more 
difficult and offer lower benefits for members. However, there is tentative evidence that the Party 
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has made progress in recruiting more members from the private sector. The models predict that 
the probability of membership in 1988 was 16% for those in the state-owned sector compared to 
1% for those in the private sector. By 1999, these predicted probabilities had changed to 23% and 
7% respectively.5 Turning to the influence of industrial structure on the probability of 
membership: working in government administration is associated with the most positive impact 
and working in education has the most negative. Party membership is expected of workers 
employed in government administration, being taken as a sign of loyalty and required for 
performing confidential or important tasks of the state, whereas it is less required of those 
following professional career paths. 
 
 
5. The wage premium for CCP membership 
 
Communist Party members earn higher wages. In the 1988 survey, the mean daily wage for urban 
workers who were members was 29% higher than the mean for those workers who were not 
members. In the 1995 and 1999 surveys, the differential had risen to 33%. However, not all of 
these differentials can be attributed to membership because membership is systematically related 
to characteristics such as experience and education. To isolate the influence of membership on 
wages, we estimate wage functions which control for the observable determinants of wages 
(Table 3). To allow membership to have a differential effect for workers with different 
characteristics, we estimate separate wage functions for members and non-members.  
 
Whether estimating separate wage functions generates bias was explored by augmenting the wage 
functions with sample selectivity correction terms derived from the probits for membership. For 
the 1999 survey, dummy variables for parental membership of the Party are possible instruments 
for the selectivity corrections as they may meet two conditions. Firstly, parental membership is 
likely to be correlated with own membership. This may work via either demand factors (e.g. 
parents act as role models) or supply factors (e.g. parents vouch for one’s character). Secondly, 
parental membership may not have strong direct effects on own wages. Empirically, the first 
condition is satisfied: when we augmented the probit model for 1999 in Table 1 with two dummy 
variables for parental Party membership, the variables were jointly significant at the 5% level. 
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The second condition was examined informally by seeing whether the instruments were 
associated with the residuals from the wage functions (this is analogous to the formal over-
identification test discussed by Deaton, 1997, p.112). We regressed the residuals from the wage 
functions on the instruments and could not reject the null hypothesis of no association at the 1% 
level of significance, although it was rejected at the 5% level for non-members (only). Given 
these results, we have some grounds for regarding parental Party membership as valid 
instruments to identify corrections for sample selectivity, although the case is stronger for 
members than for non-members. It is noteworthy, therefore, that these corrections were wholly 
insignificant - with t-ratios less than one - in both the wage function for members and that for 
non-members (Online Appendix Table A5 refers). These results imply that we can simply use 
OLS estimates of the wage functions for 1999.  
 
Neither the 1988 nor the 1995 surveys inquired about parental membership of the CCP but 
information is available for all household members, including parents living with adult children. 
Consequently, we use parental membership as an instrument for own membership for the sub-
sample of workers who lived with their parents .Neither of the two methods available for 1999 
gives selectivity corrections that are significant at the 5% level. In 1988 and 1995, use of the sub-
samples also leads to insignificant corrections for sample selectivity, with the exception of non-
members in 1988, for whom the selectivity correction was significantly negative.6 Finding that 
sample selectivity does not appear to be a significant problem in most cases gives us some 
confidence in relying on the results of the OLS estimates in Table 3. This approach seems 
preferable to working with just the sub-sample of workers still living with their parents, since that 
entails its own sample selectivity problem. Moreover, because Party members tend to be 
somewhat older and it is the younger workers who tend to still live with their parents, the 
subsamples include only small numbers of members.  
 
In what follows, we focus on the wage functions estimated separately for members and non-
members by OLS. Table 4 uses these functions to estimate the wage premia, P, for membership 
for different kinds of workers, using a simplified version of equation (5): 
P = E(lnY |M=1) - E(lnY |M=0)  =   (dp- dn)´X   (5’) 
We obtain baseline wage premia by evaluating the sample means of the explanatory variables X 
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(members and non-members combined).7 Workers with average characteristics would have 
earned 10% more in 1988 if they were in the Party, rising to 14% in 1995 and 1999.  
 
We simulate the effect on the wage of altering a given explanatory variable while holding the 
value of all other variables at their sample means. Generally speaking, the personal characteristics 
which increase the probability of CCP membership – male sex, education and experience – are 
associated with a lower wage premium for membership. For example, although men are more 
likely to be members, the CCP wage premium was only 11% for them in 1999, compared to 16% 
for women. A worker with no experience (and otherwise average characteristics) would earn 32% 
more in 1999 if they were a member whereas one with 20 years of experience would earn only 
4% more. In the same year, a primary school graduate (with 6 years of education) would receive a 
17% premium if they were in the Party compared to the 11% premium enjoyed by college 
graduates (15 years of education).8 Since these personal characteristics are associated with higher 
wages, it appears that membership may in some way substitute for such remunerative 
characteristics.  
 
Quantile regression has an advantage over OLS regression in that it can show how the wage 
premium on CCP membership varies over the wage distribution, conditioning on the other 
explanatory variables. Accordingly, the wage functions in Table 3 were augmented with a 
dummy variable for CCP membership and estimated using quantile regressions on pooled 
(members and non-members) samples of workers (Table 4). The relevant comparison is of 
quantile 25 (25th from the bottom of the conditional wage distribution) and quantile 75. Insofar as 
the omitted variables captured by the residual wage represent unobserved personal characteristics 
such as “ability”, we expect the quantile regressions to standardize for ability: the lower quantile 
should represent workers of lower ability than does the higher quantile. In both 1995 and 1999 
the coefficient on CCP membership for quantile 25 exceeds that on quantile 75 (by 4.4 and 3.5 
percentage points respectively). Membership is more valuable for workers of lower than average 
higher ability. By rewarding less able workers more, membership is again substituting for other 
remunerative characteristics. The rise in the coefficient which occurred over time was greater for 
quantile 25 than for quantile 75 (increasing by 5.6 and 3.2 percentage points respectively). Thus, 
CCP membership became absolutely more valuable generally but relatively more valuable for 
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workers of lower ability. 
 
Being a white collar worker - like being educated or experienced - is another remunerative 
characteristic that increases the chances of membership but is associated with a lower wage 
premium. In 1999, blue collar workers would earn 21% more if they were in the Party; white 
collar workers would earn only 7% more. The coefficient on the dummy variable for being a blue 
collar worker in Table 3 suggests that such members have been protected from the widening 
occupational wage differentials since 1988 experienced by non-members. Pair-wise Wald tests 
show that, at the 5% level, this variable has significantly different coefficients for members and 
non-members in both 1995 and 1999.  
 
The coefficients on the dummy variables for the ownership and industrial sector of the worker’s 
enterprise do not generally differ significantly as between members and non-members. This is 
perhaps surprising since it implies that membership does not bring significantly greater returns in 
the SOE sector than in the collective or private sectors. The main exception is government 
administration. In 1988, this variable had a significantly smaller coefficient for members than for 
non-members, implying a smaller premium (by 5%) for civil servants than for other kinds of 
workers. However, in 1999, the reverse was true - the variable had a significantly larger 
coefficient for members and the CCP wage premium for government administration workers 
stood at 20%.  
 
In summary, we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that the characteristics that make it 
likely that workers join the CCP also tend to raise the wage premium for membership. Although 
membership appears to pay more for those working in government administration and such 
workers are more likely to join the Party, the balance of the evidence demonstrates contrary 
patterns. Ceteris paribus, men are more likely to join, but the premium is lower for them. 
Similarly, more educated and experienced workers are more likely to be members but the returns 
to education and experience are lower for members. Blue-collar workers are the least likely to be 
members, yet they are the occupational category that appears to benefit the most from 
membership. Some characteristics that raise the probability of membership – such as employment 
in an SOE – appear to have no independent effect on the wage premium for membership. As 
  18 
suggested in Section 3, this pattern seems consistent with the notion that membership is primarily 
determined by screening rather than by individual demand for membership. The Party prefers to 
recruit people who will keep the system going; with marketisation, these are increasingly those 
with characteristics that are rewarded through higher wages. However, such people do not 
necessarily benefit more than others from being members. If the value of membership depends 
partly on scarcity, then among groups of workers where membership is relatively common, the 
average benefit of membership may be lower. For example, among particular groups of workers, 
there may be a given number of posts of leadership or responsibility that attract higher wages and 
which Party members are more likely to be given. If there are more members within a group of 
workers competing for those posts, there will be less chance that any one member will be 
successful - lowering the average wage premium for CCP membership. 
 
 
6. The CCP wage premium during retrenchment 
 
The main potential methodological problem with the cross-sectional approach is that the 
endogeneity of membership may give rise to biases in OLS estimates. Using techniques to 
control for sample selectivity, we have argued that such biases are not a significant problem 
with our data. However, an alternative approach is to use fixed effects estimates derived from 
panel data on individuals. If CCP members have unobserved characteristics that make them 
more productive and hence higher paid, then these characteristics should be controlled for as 
part of the individual-level fixed effect.  
 
The 1999 survey included recall questions on wages in the previous four years. We can use 
these data to construct a retrospective panel on wages from 1995 to 1999. Unfortunately, 
most of the potential explanatory variables (excluding experience) can appear only as time-
invariant variables in the analysis. For example, we do not have data on when people joined 
the CCP and so cannot estimate the overall membership premium based on wages before and 
after joining. However, we can still use a fixed effects model to explore how the wages of 
members in 1999 have grown compared to those who were not members in 1999. This will 
provide some insight into the changing fortunes of a given cohort of workers during the years 
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1995-99, which was a period of large scale retrenchment of labour.  
 
Table 5 reports the results of the fixed effects estimates, estimated separately for non-
retrenched and retrenched workers. We classify workers as retrenched if they were retrenched 
at any time between 1992 and 1999/2000; hence this classification is time-invariant. To 
estimate the possible effects of re-employment on wages, we include a time-varying dummy 
variable for being re-employed. Since the wage structure may be different for the re-
employed, we interact this dummy variable with variables for personal characteristics and 
also the year dummies.9  
 
For the majority of workers - those who have not been retrenched - the interaction term 
between the dummy variable for 1999 and that for membership is statistically significant with 
a coefficient of 0.059: compared to 1995, the premium such workers enjoyed over others rose 
by 6 percentage points. Inspection of the interactions between the CCP dummy and dummies 
for intervening years indicates that the rise of the premium was sustained and incremental 
during the period. Since this result is generated by a fixed effects estimate, the rise in the 
premium cannot be due to a change in the composition of membership, arising, for example, 
from the Party’s trying to recruit more entrepreneurial members.  
 
It has previously been shown using the 1999 survey that CCP members had a lower 
probability of being retrenched, ceteris paribus, but equal probabilities of re-employment 
conditional on being retrenched (Appleton et al., 2002). In the fixed effects wage function for 
retrenched workers, the interactions between the dummy for membership in 1999 and the year 
dummies are near zero and statistically insignificant. That is to say, those CCP members in 
1999 who had been retrenched did not fare any better than non-members. Moreover, the 
interaction between the dummy for membership in 1999 and that for re-employment is 
significantly negative. The overall effect of re-employment on wages cannot be readily 
evaluated since there are several interaction terms (not shown) between re-employment and 
other determinants of wages. At the mean of all explanatory variables, the overall effect is 
positive: retrenched workers are predicted to earn more if re-employed than they would have 
if they had kept their old jobs. This is contrary to the more common finding in other countries 
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that unemployment may “scar” a worker, leading to lower wages in future. However, a Party 
member with other personal characteristics equal to the mean for the re-employed would earn 
21% less when re-employed in a new job than they would have earned had they remained in 
their old job. This implies that the wage premia that members enjoy are tied to the jobs they 
held in 1995 and do not survive retrenchment and re-employment. This casts some doubt on 
the explanation of the CCP wage premium as reflecting either higher productive ability or 
network advantages in finding good jobs in the emerging labour market. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
There are great difficulties in attributing causation to the associations found in our cross-
section data and even our panel data. For instance, some of the determinants of CCP 
membership might themselves be influenced by CCP membership, and CCP membership 
might represent other, unobserved determinants of wages. Although we have addressed these 
issues wherever possible, our results should be regarded as suggestive of causal processes 
rather than as establishing them. Nevertheless, the study has uncovered a hitherto unexplored 
and interesting phenomenon which deserves to be explained. Accordingly, we provide our 
tentative interpretation. 
 
The economics of Communist Party membership in China is curious in several respects. A 
first paradox is that both the number of members and the size of the wage premium for 
membership appear to have risen during economic transition. With the move away from a 
command economy, one might expect membership to have become less important in 
determining a worker’s wages and general welfare. Such a reduction in the economic benefits 
would lower the demand for membership and lead to a fall in recruitment. However, the 
reverse has been observed in China during the transition. Membership has risen and the rising 
wage premium for members estimated in this paper helps us understand this phenomenon. A 
comparison of urban household surveys shows that the “pure” wage premium for membership 
has risen from 10% in 1988 to 14% in 1999. The two trends of a rising wage premium and a 
rising membership are consistent with a demand-side explanation, whereby individuals invest 
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in Party membership as a form of political capital. In terms of the aggregate time series 
evidence, a rise in the monetary benefits might be said to have induced an increase in 
membership. To some extent, the rise in the wage premium may be a disequilibrium 
phenomenon. If the Party fully accommodates the increase in demand, the greater initial rents 
will induce more people to join the Party, lowering the average return. 
 
However, such a simple demand side explanation seems inadequate to explain a second 
paradox observed in our cross-sections - that the people who are the most likely to join the 
Party receive the lowest benefit. In most cases, worker characteristics that raise the likelihood 
of a worker being in the Party also reduce the wage premium for membership. Education, 
experience, male sex and being in a white-collar occupation all significantly raise the 
probability of a worker being a member. These characteristics are also rewarded with higher 
wages, for both members and non-members, but appear to be more rewarded for non-
members than for members. In general, therefore, one cannot explain the higher rates of 
membership among certain groups by a higher expected benefit. If anything, membership 
rates are higher when the premia are lower.  
 
This second paradox suggests that membership is supply-constrained rather than demand-
constrained: the cross-sectional patterns are determined by the Party’s screening decisions, 
not by individuals’ demand to join. Although the Party has allowed the number of members 
to rise, it has nevertheless rationed places. The rationing criteria reflect the personal 
characteristics that are valuable for the CCP’s political and economic objectives. As a result, 
there may be a scarcity value to membership for workers with less favoured characteristics. 
For example, membership leads to higher wages partly through providing increased access to 
a certain number of responsible posts. Securing these posts may provide more of an increase 
in wages for a person with otherwise low-return characteristics than for one with high-return 
characteristics. Hence, membership may partly substitute for experience or education in 
obtaining certain posts. This effect may be reinforced if competition for some posts is limited 
to people of similar characteristics. For example, a factory floor supervisor may have to be a 
blue-collar rather than a white-collar worker. If there are relatively few Party members among 
the blue-collar workers, then the likelihood of any one member obtaining a desired 
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supervisory post will be higher and thus the benefits of membership greater.  
 
What explains the rise in the wage premium for Party members? We found no evidence that it 
reflects an increase in the average ability of members or an increase in the returns to ability. 
When we used parental Party membership as an instrument to correct for the selectivity of 
own membership, those recruited into the CCP appeared not to have higher unobserved 
productivity. Recall data on wages prior to 1999 showed increases in the wage premium even 
after controlling for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics. Our quantile 
regression analysis indicated that the wage premium on membership increased more for low 
ability than for high ability workers. Those members who were unlucky enough to be 
retrenched after 1995 experienced wage scarring, unlike non-members. This implies that the 
wage premium was job-specific, rather than reflecting generally higher productive ability or 
social capital: when turned into “outsiders” from their enterprises, Party members seem ill-
equipped to flourish in a harsher, more competitive environment. 
 
We tentatively conclude that the rise in the wage premium for members – much like the rise 
in the gender gap in wages - may be a by-product of the general increase in wage differentials 
during the transition from planning. Whereas before, income inequalities were compressed 
for political reasons, under reform, enterprises have more discretion in setting wages. This 
may give more room for discriminatory, as well as productive, factors to work in determining 
wages. CCP members may more be able to secure personal benefits from their political status 
during the transition from planning. Although the rise in the wage premium could have been 
fortuitous rather than planned, the Party may well have had an interest in allowing it to 
happen. If the non-economic benefits of membership diminish – as ideology and status 
become less important - a higher premium may be necessary to keep up recruitment and 
membership, and so maintain Party control.  
 
What are the implications of the rise in the wage premium for Party members during reform? 
At face value, it contradicts Nee’s market transition hypothesis of a rise in the return to 
productive characteristics and a fall in the returns to unproductive ones. This need not be a 
concern on efficiency grounds if the rise in the wage premium could actually be explained in 
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terms of the rewards to unobserved productivity of Party members. However, some doubt is 
cast on this explanation by our evidence that the rising premium does not appear to be 
explained by either an increase in the average ability of members or an increase in the returns 
to ability. The rise in the premium may indicate a limitation in the extent to which the 
Chinese labour market has become competitive.  
 
In distributional terms, an increasing wage premium would seem to be undesirable. Not only 
is it an unjustified horizontal inequality but it is also likely to worsen vertical inequalities 
since CCP members typically have characteristics which are economically rewarded in their 
own right. However, the political implications of these distributional changes are less clear-
cut. One could take a sanguine view and argue that growing benefits for Party members are 
desirable because they help to ensure that the reforms are self-sustaining. If members do well 
during the transition, they will continue to support the reforms. Nonetheless, if these benefits 
are viewed as unjustified, they risk discrediting both the Party and the reforms.  
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Table 1: Probits models for CCP membership, selected variables 
 
 1988 1995 1999 
Constant -2.883 
(25.16)*** 
-3.082 
(24.74)*** 
-3.458 
(18.51)*** 
Male sex 0.628 
(23.29)*** 
0.493 
(16.66)*** 
0.361 
(9.01)*** 
Experience 9.62E-02 
(18.14)*** 
0.089 
(14.79)*** 
6.96E-02 
(8.21)*** 
Experience squared  -1.06E-03 
(10.04)*** 
-0.001 
(7.55)*** 
-4.22E-04 
(2.33)** 
Full-time education (years) 0.069 
(11.48)*** 
0.090 
(15.58)*** 
0.135 
(14.03)*** 
Education -0.233 
(4.76)*** 
-0.130 
(2.24)** 
-0.160 
(1.98)** 
Industry 
(default variable 
is 
manufacturing) 
Government  0.674 
(15.06)*** 
0.552 
(11.99)*** 
0.448 
(6.23)*** 
Number of observations 17733 12245 6281 
Log-likelihood -6563.5 -5210.8 -2777.0 
Restricted log-likelihood -9662.7 -6818.8 -3656.6    
Pseudo R-squared 0.3207 0.2358 0.2406 
 
Notes: (1) Dummy variables for regions, for “other occupation”, “other ownership” and “other industry” are also 
controlled for but not report for brevity.  
(2) T-ratios are in brackets. *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level and below, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
level. 
(3) In this, and subsequent, tables, only those variables that are discussed in the text are reported in the table; the 
full results are shown in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. 
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Table 2: Predicted probabilities of CCP membership and predicted CCP wage premium 
(percentages), selected variables 
 
 (a) Predicted probability CCP member (b) Predicted CCP wage premium 
 1988 1995 1999 1988 1995 1999 
Baseline  14 18 21 10 14 14 
Male 22 25 26 9 11 11 
Female 8 12 16 12 17 16 
Experience of 0 years 1 1 2 34 25 32 
Experience of 10 years 5 6 7 15 23 10 
Experience of 20 years 17 18 19 6 12 4 
Experience of 30 years 30 31 34 5 12 6 
Education of 0 years 4 3 1 23 28 21 
Education of 6 years 8 9 6 15 20 17 
Education of 9 years 12 15 13 12 16 15 
Education of 12 years 17 22 24 9 12 13 
Education of 15 years 22 30 38 5 8 11 
Ownership       
State-owned 16 20 23 9 13 15 
Private enterprises 1 3 7 -20 50 9 
Occupation       
White collar 29 28 33 9 9 7 
Blue collar 7 9 11 11 20 21 
Industry       
Education 9 14 14 10 9 11 
Government  34 34 32 5 8 20 
 
Notes:  
(1) All results evaluated at the mean of the other explanatory variables. 
(2) Probabilities generated from Table 1, wage premia from Table 3.  
(3) The full results are shown in Table A3 of the Online Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Wage functions for 1988, 1995 and 1999 for CCP members and non-members, selected 
variables 
 
 1988 1995 1999 
 Non-CP CP Non-CP CP Non-CP CP 
Male 0.102 
(14.54) *** 
0.073 
(5.16)*** 
0.144 
(10.26)*** 
0.087 
(3.84)*** 
0.195 
(10.35)*** 
0.153 
(4.86)*** 
Experience 4.96E-02 
(36.54) *** 
3.01E-02 
(9.58)*** 
5.987E-02 
(20.91)*** 
5.10E-02 
(9.29)*** 
4.71E-02 
(12.29)*** 
3.016E-02 
(4.67)*** 
Experience squared 
term 
-7.30E-04 
(23.05) *** 
-3.56E-04 
(5.82)*** 
-1.052E-03 
(15.21)*** 
-8.82E-04 
(7.71)*** 
-8.79E-04 
(10.08)*** 
-4.986E-04 
(3.66)*** 
Full-time education 
(years) 
0.033 
(16.32) *** 
0.024 
(9.53)*** 
0.036 
(12.42)*** 
0.025 
(7.33)*** 
0.041 
(8.96)*** 
0.035 
(6.18)*** 
Occupation (default variable is white collar) 
       
Blue collar -0.057 
(6.47) *** 
-0.041 
(2.21)** 
-0.165 
(9.74)*** 
-0.066 
(1.99)** 
-0.171 
(7.45)*** 
-0.044 
(1.02) 
Industry (default variable is manufacturing) 
Government  -0.060 
(3.72) *** 
-0.120 
(7.71)*** 
0.082 
(3.35)*** 
0.027 
(1.10) 
0.241 
(6.37)*** 
0.338 
(8.05)*** 
No. of observations 13571 4162 9244 3001 4592 1689 
Adjusted R-squared 0.364 0.247 0.273 0.298 0.283 0.264 
 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is log hourly wage; T-ratios are in brackets.  
(2) *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level 
(3) The full results are shown in Table A5 of the Online Appendix.
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Table 4: Coefficients on CCP dummy in quantile wage regressions 
 
 1988 1995 1999 1999 minus 1988 
Quantile 25 0.051 0.073 0.107 0.056 
 
 (6.39)*** (5.08)*** (4.59)*** 
 
Quantile 75 0.048 0.029 0.072 0.024 
 (6.21)*** (2.15)*** (4.02)*** 
 
Quantile 25 minus 
75 
0.003 0.044 0.035 0.032 
No. of observations 17733 12245 6281  
 
Notes: 
(1) The dependent variable is log hourly wage 
(2) T-ratios are in brackets. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
(3) Fuller results are shown in Table A6 of the Online Appendix 
. 
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Table 5: Fixed effects estimates of changes in wages function coefficients, 1995-1999, 
selected variables 
 
 Non-retrenched Retrenched 
 
Coefficien
t 
T-ratio 
 
Coefficient T-ratio 
 
Year dummies: 
99 0.370    7.84   *** 0.037  0.12  
98 0.283    6.20  *** 0.177  1.06  
97 0.129    2.91 *** 0.113  0.73  
96 0.000    -0.00   0.055  0.37  
Interactions with year dummies: 
Party member*99 0.059     4.25 *** 0.122  0.94  
Party member*98 0.055    3.95 *** -0.001 -0.02  
Party member*97 0.039    2.76  *** 0.066  1.01  
Party member*96 0.010   0.70    -0.013 -0.21  
Dummy variable for re-employment (time 
varying) 
   0.842  2.93 *** 
Interactions with a time varying dummy variable for re-employment: 
Party member*re-employment    -0.319 -2.83 *** 
Number of observations 26938 4639 
R-squared across individuals 0.1421 0.0675 
 
Notes: 
(1) *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10% level. 
(2) The full results are shown in Table A7 of the Online Appendix. 
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Notes 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The authors are grateful to the CCK Foundation and DfID (under Escor grant R7526) for supporting the research 
and for comments received from referees and from seminars and conferences at CERDI-CNRS, Université 
d'Auvergne, and the universities of Gothenburg, Nottingham and Oxford. 
2
 For example, from their sample of 2,096 people in Shanghai and Tianjin in 1993, 18% of whom had joined the 
Party, Bian et al. (2001) found no-one who had withdrawn from membership. 
3
 This is pithily expressed in two quotes from CCP members cited by Rosenthal (2002):"What does the 
Communist Party stand for now? Nothing. Stability maybe. But really no ideals at all.” and "There is almost no-
one now who believes in the Party for its ideals." 
4
 However, information on income before and after joining the Party may not be informative: people do not leave 
the CCP (so reducing ‘events’) and the economic benefits may flow only some time after joining. 
5
 The evidence is tentative: Wald tests show that the change is significant only at the 11% level. 
6 This result implies that there was a positive correlation between the unobservables determining wages for non- 
members and the unobservables determining CCP membership.  
7 Strictly speaking, P is an approximation of the percentage wage differential; Table 4 uses the transformation 
exp (P)-1 (see Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1981).  
8
 Pair-wise Wald tests indicate that almost all of these differences are significant at the 5% level. 
9
 The results of this analysis are reported in Appleton et al.,2004. 
